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Abstract—Source location privacy is becoming an increasingly
important property in wireless sensor network applications,
such as asset monitoring. The original source location problem
is to protect the location of a source in a wireless sensor
network from a single distributed eavesdropper attack. Several
techniques have been proposed to address the source location
problem, where most of these apply some form of traffic
analysis and engineering to provide enhanced privacy. One such
technique, namely fake sources, has proved to be promising
for providing source location privacy. Recent research has
concentrated on investigating the efficiency of fake source
approaches under various attacker models. In this paper, we
(i) provide a novel formalisation of the source location privacy
problem, (ii) prove the source location privacy problem to be
NP-complete, and (iii) provide a heuristic that yields an optimal
level of privacy under appropriate parameterisation. Crucially,
the results presented show that fake sources can provide a high,
sometimes optimal, level of privacy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of ad-hoc networks, such as wireless sensor
networks (WSNs), has enabled several novel classes of ap-
plication, including monitoring and tracking. For monitoring
applications, the deployment of WSNs varies from safety-
critical monitoring applications such as military, health and
radiation monitoring, to non-critical applications such as
temperature and humidity control. For safety-critical ap-
plications, the dependability if a WSN is an important
consideration. In particular, privacy, which can be generally
described as the guarantee that information can only be
observed or deciphered by those intended to observe or
decipher it [1], is an important property. As WSNs operate in
a broadcast medium, attackers can easily intercept messages
and launch attacks based on the information they derive.
The security threats that exist for WSNs can be classified
along two dimensions: (i) content-based privacy threats
and (ii) context-based privacy threats. The privacy threats
relating to content are based on the contents of messages,
i.e., attacks are launched with regard to the data generated
by the higher network layers - data generated either at the
application level, e.g., values sensed by sensors, or lower-
layer levels, e.g., location and time-stamps. In such attacks,
attackers try to capture data to learn about the status of
the network so that relevant attacks can be launched. Much
research has addressed content-based attacks [2]. On the
other hand, context-based privacy threats are those that are
based on the context associated with the measurement and
transmission of sensed data. Context is a multi-attribute
concept that captures several aspects of sensed data, some of
which are environmental. These aspects include location and
time, both of which allow proper semantics to be given to
sensed data. While content-based threats have been widely
addressed [2], context-based threats are becoming increas-
ingly popular. For content-based threats, nodes launching
attacks are often modelled as Byzantine nodes [3] [4], with
cryptographic techniques often being used to address these
problems [2] [3] [5]. However, cryptographic techniques
cannot help with handling context-based threats. New tech-
niques must be introduced to handle context-based threats.
One attribute of context that is crucial in many application
domains is location. Location information can be embedded
in a message but remain inaccessible to an attacker due to
message encryption. Hence, as location information can not
be obtained directly, an attacker may opt to infer it. An
important problem in monitoring applications is the problem
of source location privacy (SLP). In this problem, a WSN
is monitoring an asset, such as an endangered animal. Then,
periodically, the nodes detecting the asset, which we term
source nodes, will send messages to a dedicated node, called
a sink, for data collection. If the location of the source nodes
is compromised then an attacker can easily capture the asset.
It is possible to infer message location information
through various techniques, depending on the power of
the attacker. For example, Metha et.al [6] assumes that
an attacker has a small wireless network of his own that
captures messages, and shows how the attacker can infer the
location of nodes after messages have been intercepted. On
the other hand, Kamat et.al [1] assume a single attacker, who
uses the routing protocol to infer the location of the source.
For example, in a military environment, soldiers out on a
surveillance mission may relay information to a sink. An
attacker can intercept these messages, and trace them back
to the soldiers, thereby compromising their safety. Several
possible techniques to handle the SLP problem have been
proposed [1] [6] [7] [8] [9]. In this paper, we focus on the
fake source technique, first proposed by seminal work in this
area [1]. When applying this technique, a (set of) node(s)
is chosen to act as a decoy for the real source, i.e., to act
as a fake source. The fake source generates messages to
engineer network traffic in such a way so as to confuse an
attacker. Despite the intuitive nature of the approach, little
work has been done to understand the detailed working of
the fake source technique. Recently, two algorithms were
proposed that address the tradeoffs between privacy and
energy usage [10], where these algorithms were shown to
provide a balance between privacy and energy consumption.
A. Contributions
In this paper, we provide a novel formalisation of the SLP
problem, allowing us to identify two important parame-
ters that underpin the efficiency of algorithms that provide
SLP: (i) message rates, and (ii) fake message transmission
duration. Under this formalisation, we show the problem
to be NP-complete. We subsequently propose a heuristic,
parameterised by these considerations, and evaluate its effi-
ciency in providing SLP. Our results show that, under certain
parameterisation, it is possible to obtain optimal privacy, i.e.,
the real source is never captured.
B. Paper Structure
This paper is structured as follows. In Section II we provide
a survey of related work. In Section III, we define the
adopted network and attacker models. In Section IV, we
present two of the contributions of the paper, namely proof
of NP-hardness and an algorithm that provides SLP. In
Section V, we outline the experimental approach employed
in this paper. The results generated by this experimental
approach are presented and discussed in Section VI. Finally,
Section VII concludes with a contribution summary and a
discussion of future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of SLP first appeared around 2005 in a seminal
paper by Kamat et al. [1], which was shortly followed by
[11]. The authors of [1] proposed a formalisation of the SLP
problem, and subsequently investigated several algorithms
to enhance SLP. They proposed the fake source technique,
but indicated that it has poor performance despite being an
expensive technique. They went on to propose an algorithm
called phantom routing, where messages are initially sent
on a random walk of a given length, followed by a normal
flooding. The overall result implies that attackers cannot
fully trace back messages to the real source. Since then,
research has addressed the problem using a variety of
attacker models and assumptions. Different attacker models
and assumptions lead to different types of solutions or
techniques for enhancing SLP. Subsequently, an attack was
shown to subvert the phantom routing technique that was
proposed by Kamat et.al [1], with the added assumption that
nodes have access to their location using say GPS devices.
In this work, the attacker is local, meaning it does not have
instant access to global network information. Rather, the
attacker will have to slowly accumulate knowledge to gain
global network information. We focus on the fake source
technique with such an attacker in this paper.
There are several other research directions relating to
privacy in WSNs. Some have investigated the problem of
base station-location privacy [12]. Others have focused on
more powerful attackers, such as in [6] and [13], whilst other
research has focused on temporal privacy [14]. However,
the main limitations of existing work relating to the fake
source technique are the limiting assumptions made and the
lack of proposals relating to algorithms with high levels
of privacy. For example, a global eavesdropper is assumed
in [12], whilst [6] and [13] assume attackers have powerful
sensors.
III. MODELS
In this section, we provide definitions of the adopted network
and attacker models.
A. System Model
We define a wireless sensor node as a computing device
equipped with a wireless interface and associated with a
unique identifier. Communication from a node is typically
modelled with a circular communication range centred on
the node. With this model, a node is thought to able to
exchange data with all devices within its communication
range. A link exists between two nodes m and m′ if both
m and m′ can communicate with each other.
A WSN is a set of wireless sensor nodes with links
between pairs of nodes. We assume that all nodes in the
network have the same communication range. Such a net-
work is modelled as an undirected graph G = (V,E), where
the set of vertices V represents the set of N wireless sensor
nodes and the set of edges E represents the set of links
between the nodes. Two nodes m ∈ V and m′ ∈ V are said
to be 1-hop neighbours (or neighbours) iff {m,m′} ∈ E,
i.e., m and m′ are in each other’s communication range.
We denote by M the set of m’s neighbours. The graph
G = (V,E) defines the topology of the network. In this
paper, we focus on grid-like network topology, i.e., network
of size n ∗ n = N . There exists a distinguished node in the
network called a sink S, which is responsible for collecting
data. Other nodes v ∈ V \ {S} sense data and then route
the data to the sink for collection. In general, any node can
be a source of sensed data. In this paper, we assume that
the data source is not close to the attacker. We denote the
distance between the sink and a node n ∈ V by δn. There
exists a relation on V , denoted ≺H , such that m ≺H n iff
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H(δm, δn). For example, if H is the function “closer”, then
the relation captures which of nodes is closer to the sink.
Sensor nodes route messages to the sink, generally using
data aggregation convergecast protocols [15]. We assume
that there can be several nodes acting as message sources at
the same time. We assume that the network is event-triggered
- when a node senses an object of interest, it starts sending
messages to the sink over a certain time period.
B. Attacker Model
In general, an attacker can be considered to be a set of
sensor nodes. It has been proposed in [16] that the strength
of an attacker can be factored along two main dimensions:
(i) presence, and (ii) actions. For example, presence can
be local or global, while actions can be eavesdropping, or
reprogramming among others. Using these two dimensions,
a lattice of attacker strengths was developed. Based on this
lattice, we consider one type of attacker, namely a distributed
eavesdropping attacker. There can be different implementa-
tions of this type of attacker. For example, such an attacker
can be a single mobile person equipped with a sensor node
allowing him to eavesdrop. Another implementation can be
multiple persons, each with a sensor node, eavesdropping on
the network [10]. In this paper, we consider the single person
implementation of the distributed eavesdropper attacker.
When a source sends a message, we assume the message
to be encrypted. We assume that the source includes its ID
in the encrypted messages, but only the sink can tell a nodes
location from its ID. As a result, even if the attacker is able
to break the encryption in a reasonably short time frame, it
cannot tell the sources location. We assume the distributed
eavesdropper attacker to be equipped with devices, such as
antenna and spectrum analysers, so it can measure the angle
of arrival of a message and the received signal strength
to identify the immediate sender and move to that node.
We point out that the attacker cannot learn the source of
a message by merely observing a relayed version of the
message. We also assume that the attacker can move at any
speed and place no restrictions on their power consumption.
In addition, it also has a large amount of memory to keep
track of information such as messages that have been heard
and nodes that have been visited.
In assessing the privacy of a system, one should always
assume that the worst case scenario, in that the attacker
knows the methods being used by the system. Therefore, we
assume that the attacker knows (i) the location of the sink
node, (ii) the network topology, but cannot however infer the
location of a message source based on a relayed message,
and (iii) the routing algorithm used. However, the attacker
does not know the number of assets being monitored, and the
possible location of the asset, i.e., the asset can be randomly
located in the network. These assumptions imply that an
attacker has no way of determining if a message is a fake
one or a real one. Apart from these assumptions, the only
knowledge a distributed eavesdropper has is that which is
deduced based on eavesdropping across the network. For
example, when he hears a (relayed) message coming from
a (legitimate) node within its neighbourhood, he can locate
the sender of that message (not the source of the message).
We also assume that the attacker does not know the number
of possible assets being monitored. This can happen when
monitoring endangered animal species, which hunters may
try and poach.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE FAKE SOURCE PROBLEM -
PROBLEM STATEMENT, COMPLEXITY AND HEURISTICS
In this section, we briefly explain the fake source technique
for SLP in a WSNs. We subsequently present a formalisation
of the problem, and prove it to be NP-complete.
A. Fake Sources: An Informal Introduction
The fake source problem, as per the original setup [1],
is as follows: There is a message source (real source) in
a WSN, with an attacker initially positioned at the sink.
The attacker is positioned at the sink to ensure that it
captures messages being sent there. As the sink receives
messages from the source, usually along the shortest path,
the attacker can trace these messages, hop by hop, back
to the source. The fake source technique, as its name
suggests, involves selecting a subset of nodes to act as fake
sources to simulate the real source. In their seminal work
on fake sources, Kamat et al. [1] proposed a formalisation
of SLP, and the fake source technique as a viable approach.
They also proposed two types of fake sources: (i) short-
lived fake sources, and (ii) permanent fake sources. The
work concluded that permanent fake sources outperform
temporary fake sources [1]. However, in a recent work, it
was shown that implementations of permanent fake sources
that attempt to trade-off energy against privacy may not
impart the required level of privacy [10]. In this paper, we
focus on both of types of fake sources. The intuition is to
use temporary fake sources to quickly “lure” the attacker
away from the source, and to use permanent fake sources to
then keep the attacker away from the real source. Modelling
transient and permanent fake sources can be achieved using
a duration parameter, where the duration of a permanent
fake source is typically ∞ and the duration of a temporary
fake source is finite and bounded. This will enable a tradeoff
between energy and privacy [17], though the main objective
of this paper is to understand the complexity of providing
source location privacy.
Solving a specific instance of the source location privacy
problem corresponds to the location of the source. Unless
the source is static, which is not the focus of this paper,
a fake source has a time bound during which to send fake
messages. Specifically, this is the deadline by which the last
fake message will be sent in that instance of the fake source
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problem. Note that attempting to attract an attacker towards
a fake source is done in the context of a routing structure.
A real source is characterised by the following parameters:
location and message transmission rate. Any implementation
of the fake source technique will have to investigate the
impact of at least these two parameters. It has been argued
that a fake source will have to be a similar distance away
from the sink as the real source for better privacy [1].
B. Fake Sources - Problem Statement
In this section, we provide a novel formalisation of the fake
source problem. Specifically, we formalise the problem as a
scheduling problem, whereby fake sources are scheduled to
send fake messages to lure an attacker away from the real
source.
A fake source Fi is a determined by the duration di
during which it acts as a fake source. If di is (small
and) finite, then the fake source is temporary, else it is
permanent. The selection of fake sources is important as it
plays an important role in ensuring high levels of source
location privacy. A fake source selection algorithm chooses
a set of fake sources from a set of candidate nodes, by
“tagging” the relevant nodes with given durations, i.e., sets
the fake source flag of a chosen node to be 1 and sets its
duration to di. Since fake sources send at different times,
there exists a “precedence” relationship between the nodes.
In this work, there exists a precedence relationship between
temporary fake sources and permanent fake sources, where
temporary fake sources try to first “lure” attacker away,
and then permanent fake sources ensure the attacker is kept
away from the real source.
The source location privacy (SLP) problem can be stated
as follows:
Definition 1 (SLP): Given a graph G = (V,E), a set F
of fake source tags {F1 . . . Ff}, each Fi associated with
duration di, a relation ≺ on V , a set N of m nodes
{n1 . . . nm} ⊂ V , a deadline τ and a routing strategy R,
assign tags in T to nodes in N to obtain an m-node schedule
σ for T that meets the deadline τ under R and obeys ≺.
C. SLP Complexity
We now present the first contribution of this paper - a proof
that the formalised SLP problem is NP-complete.
Theorem 1 (SLP Complexity): The Source Location Privacy
problem is NP-complete.
Proof : We reduce the multiprocessor scheduling with prece-
dence constraints (MSPC) to SLP. We first define the MSPC
problem, and then identify the mapping between MSPC and
SLP.
Instance: The MSPC problem is as follows: Given a set
T = {T1 . . . Tn} of tasks, with task Ti having execution
time ei, a set P of m ∈ Z+ processors, partial order l on
T , and a deadline D ∈ Z+.
Question: Is there an m-processor schedule σ for
T that meets the overall deadline D and obeys the
precedence constraints, i.e., such that Ti l Tj implies that
σ(Tj) ≥ σ(Ti) + ei.
Mapping:
• T 7→ F
• ei 7→ di
• P 7→ N
• D 7→ τ
• l 7→≺
Also, given a schedule σ for SLP, and a routing strategy R,
it can be verified in polynomial time if σ completes before
deadline τ , implying SLP ∈ NP .
D. A Heuristic for Source Location Privacy
In this section, we present the second contribution of
this paper - a heuristic that can provide near-optimal
source location privacy under specific parameterisation.
We develop the heuristic based on observations made in
previous work [1]. It was previously observed that a flooding
algorithm provides no source location privacy [1]. We thus
use the flooding algorithm as baseline protocol, and enhance
it for source location privacy. Thus, any improvement in
the level of source location privacy will thus be due to the
enhancement (and not due to the flooding protocol). We
thus built our heuristic on top of a simple flooding algorithm
which the real source uses to send messages to the sink.
This assumption is more general than assuming a single
shortest path routing algorithm from source to sink. Also,
observe that the flooding algorithm is outside the heuristic
we are proposing, and that the heuristic will work with other
routing techniques, though with possibly different efficiency.
Flooding Algorithm: The adapted flooding protocol is im-
plemented as follows (and is shown in Figures 1 and 2): The
(real) source (Figure 2) generates an application message,
as a result of detecting the asset, and broadcasts it to every
normal node (Figure 1) in its neighbourhood. The message
contains a sequence number, denoted by count, and a field,
called hop, that keeps track of the (hop) distance the message
has travelled. The hop value is initialised to 0 by the real
source node.
When a (normal) node receives the message, it checks if
the message is new, i.e., whether or not it has previously
seen the same sequence number. If it is new, then the
node increments the hop value by one and broadcasts the
message. This process is repeated until the message reaches
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the sink. The value of the hop count at the sink represents
the distance of the real source from the sink.
Protocol Extension for Fake Sources: The protocol exten-
sion is shown in Figures 3 and 4. When the sink receives
the first such message (Figure 3), it broadcasts a special
message, called a FakeNode message, instantiated with the
value of hop, and contains the sequence number count of the
message for which fake sources have to be selected. When
a node receives the FakeNode message, it checks if it has
seen such a message with the count sequence number. If it
has not, then it checks if the hop value is 1. If the hop value
is greater than 1, then the node becomes a temporary fake
source (Figure 1). This means that the node starts sending a
certain number of messages over a time duration d. When
d expires, the node broadcasts the FakeNode message, with
the hop value decremented by 1.
If, on the other hand, the hop value is 1, then the node
generates a random number and becomes a permanent fake
source if the number is greater than a given threshold σ
(Figure 1), i.e., when it becomes a permanent fake source,
it transmits fake messages indefinitely. The generation of a
random number is done so that the number of permanent
fake sources is controlled. Fake sources send fake messages
at a given rate over a certain duration (Figure 4).
Implementation Issues: The structure of the messages sent
by the temporary and permanent fake sources are identical
to those sent by the real source. The only difference is in the
payload, where in the case of the fake sources, the payload
is random. Based on this, we assume an attacker cannot
distinguish between a real message and a fake one. Note
that, as our assumption is that real messages are encrypted,
so are the fake messages. This means that only legitimate
nodes can read the fake messages. However, when there is
more than one fake source operating, this may result in a
legitimate intermediate node dropping messages from two
different fake source nodes on the basis that the messages
were identical.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section we describe the simulation environment and
protocol configurations that were used to generate the results
presented in Section VI.
A. Simulation Environment
The simulation environment was based on the JProwler net-
work simulator [18]. JProwler is a discrete event simulator
that can accurately model sensor nodes and the communi-
cations between them. JProwler provides two radio models,
Gaussian and Rayleigh, which determine the signal level
of transmissions and the communication range of nodes.
The Rayleigh model was selected for use in all experiments
because it models the situation where sensor nodes have
process j - If node is a normal node
variables
% Messages seen
messages: set of int init ∅
% The distance from the source to this node
realhop: int init 0;
% Number of messages seen from source
messagecounter: int init 0;
% Ignore choice variable
ignorechoose: int init 0;
constants
% Distance to the sink, probability threshold
∆, σ: int, real;
actions
% Receiving choose message
receiveChoose:: rcv〈Choose, hash, ssd, hop, count〉 →
if (hash 6∈ messages ∧ ignorechoose = 0) then
messages := messages ∪ {hash};
if (∆ = ssd) then
possiblyBecomeFS(infinite duration, σ);
else
possiblyBecomeFS(temp duration);
fi; fi;
% Receiving fake messaget
receiveFake:: rcv〈Fake, hash〉 →
if (hash 6∈ messages) then
messages := messages ∪ {hash};
BCAST〈Fake, hash〉;
fi;
% Receiving normal message
receiveNormal:: rcv〈Normal, hash, ssd, hop, count〉 →
if (hash 6∈ messages) then
messages := messages ∪ {hash};
messagecounter, realhop := count, hop+ 1;
if (messagecounter = 1 ∧ realhop <= 3
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ssd) then
ignorechoose := 1;
fi;
BCAST〈Normal, hash, ssd, hop+ 1, count〉;
fi;
% Receiving away messaget
receiveAway:: rcv〈Away, hash, ssd, hop, count〉 →
if (hash 6∈ messages) then
messages := messages ∪ {hash};
if (messagecounter < count ∨ realhop > ssd) then
BCAST〈Choose, hash(Away), ssd, hop+ 1, count〉;
possiblyBecomeFS(temp duration);
fi;
fi;
Figure 1: Source Location Privacy Algorithm - Normal.
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process j - If node is Source
variables
% The number of messages sent
count: int init 1;
% rate: how fast messages are sent.
rate: timer init δ;
constants
% Distance to the sink
∆: int;
actions
% Sending normal messages
sendNormal:: timeout(rate) →
BCAST〈Normal, hash(Normal),∆, 0, count〉;
count := count + 1;
set(rate , δ);
Figure 2: Source Location Privacy Algorithm - Source.
process j - If node is Sink
variables
% Messages seen
messages: set of int init ∅
% Sink sent indicator
sinksent: int init 0;
actions
% Receiving fake message
receiveFake:: rcv〈Fake, hash〉 →
if (hash 6∈ messages) then
messages := messages ∪ {hash};
BCAST〈Fake, hash〉;
fi;
% Receiving normal message
receiveNormal:: rcv〈Normal, hash, ssd, hop, count〉 →
if (hash 6∈ messages) then
messages := messages ∪ {hash};
if (sinksent = 0) then
sinksent := 1;
BCAST〈Away, hash(Away), ssd, hop+ 1, 1〉;
fi;
fi;
Figure 3: Source Location Privacy Algorithm - Sink.
process j - If node is fake source
variables
% rate: how fast messages are sent.
% duration: how long we will stay a fake source.
rate, duration: timer init α, β;
actions
% Sending fake messages
sendFake:: timeout(rate) →
if (duration >= (currenttime− starttime)) then
BCAST〈Choose, hash(Choose), ssd, hop+ 1, count〉;
BECOME NORMAL;
else
BCAST〈Fake, hash(Fake)〉;
set(rate , α);
fi;
Figure 4: Source Location Privacy Algorithm - Fake Source.
mobility, which is consistent with the assumption that an
attacker will have mobility within a sensor network. The
difference between the two radio models is that, with the
Rayleigh model, the neighbourhood is updated whenever
there is movement, which is important for the attacker. In
case nodes are static, the Rayleigh model is similar to the
Gaussian model.
B. Network Configuration
A square grid network layout of size n× n was used in all
experiments, where n ∈ {11, 15, 21, 25}, i.e., networks with
121, 225, 441 and 625 nodes respectively. A single source
node generated messages and a single sink node collected
messages. The source and sink nodes were distinct. The
rate at which messages from the real source were generated
was varied. The sets of experiments for each network size
and parameter configuration were performed for five source
node locations; the four corners of the grid and a random
location at the perimeter of the grid. To ensure the validity of
the results presented, 500 repeats were performed for each
source location, and for each combination of parameters. The
sink node was located at the centre of the grid. Nodes were
located 28 meters apart. The node separation distance was
determined analytically, based on the static fading values
calculated by the adopted radio model. This separation
distance ensured that messages (i) pass through multiple
nodes from source to sink, (ii) can move only one hop at a
time and (iii) can only be passed to horizontally or vertically
adjacent nodes.
C. Protocol Configuration
The flooding protocol was used as a baseline against which
the extended flooding protocol was measured. Initially, we
set the threshold σ to 0, i.e., when the hop value is
1, all nodes receiving the FakeNode message becomes a
permanent fake source. In this paper, we are interested in
the impact three factors about the protocol implementation
have on the level of source location privacy. These are:
1) The duration di a temporary fake source ni sends
messages.
2) The rate δi at which a temporary or permanent fake
source ni sends messages.
3) The impact of threshold σ on capture ratio.
In the simulation, the durations over which a temporary
fake source send messages were 1, 2 and 4 seconds respec-
tively. For the message rates, we vary for the fake sources as
well as for the real source. For the real source, the message
rates used were 1, 2 and 4 messages per second, whereas
the message rates for the fake sources, in general, were 2, 4
and 8 messages per second. We also never run simulations
where the message rate of the real source is higher than that
of the fake source, since the capture ratio will then be 100%
(as the attacker is “attracted” faster towards the real source
than towards the fake source).
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Table I: Safety period for each network size and send rate.
Network Size Safety Period
1/sec 2/sec 4/sec 8/sec
11× 11 31.85 16.43 8.16 8.24
15× 15 46.35 23.27 12.25 13.17
21× 21 67.30 34.23 18.71 19.30
25× 25 84.88 42.75 22.79 23.95
D. Safety Period
A concept called safety period was introduced in [1] to
capture the number of messages that has to be sent by the
real source before it gets detected. In general, for maximum
privacy, the safety period should ideally be very high. In this
paper, we use an alternative, but similar, definition for safety
period: for each network size and source rate, using flooding,
we calculate the average time it takes to detect the real
source (i.e., capture the asset). When we run simulations for
SLP, we allow for a higher safety period, since the premise is
that our proposed extended routing algorithm will provide a
higher source location privacy, and hence may require more
time for source capture. The reason for using this definition
of safety period is that it bounds the simulation time. The
safety period, for each network size and rate, for flooding
is shown in Table I. The safety period is double the average
time taken for source detection, i.e., for capture, since it
allows an attacker to go at the opposite end of the network
and back.
E. Simulation experiments
An experiment constituted a single execution of the simu-
lation environment using a specified protocol configuration,
network size and safety period. An experiment terminated
when the source node had been captured by an attacker
or the safety period has expired. JProwler was extended to
allow the safety period and the capture ratio to be monitored
during simulation.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of our experimentation
under various protocol parameterisations.
A. Metrics
We use the metric capture ratio to indicate the level of SLP.
The capture ratio metric is calculated as the ratio of the
number of runs in which the source is captured to the total
number of runs. If the capture ratio is 0, then it means that
the SLP is maximal, whilst the SLP is minimal if the capture
ratio is 1. Further, we assume all fake message transmission
duration ti to be equal for all temporary fake sources, and the
message rate λi to be equal for all temporary fake sources.
B. Impact of Temporary Fake Source Duration on SLP
In this section, we investigate the impact of message rates on
SLP. Specifically, we wish to understand how the duration
during which a fake source sends fake messages affect SLP.
Intuitively, the higher the duration, the higher the chance
of the attacker being “pulled back”, decreasing the capture
ratio.
It can be observed from Figure 5 that, for a given real
source broadcast rate and fake source broadcast rate, the
capture ratio generally decreases for increasing temporary
fake source duration. A similar observation can be made
from Figure 6. We also observe in Figures 5 and 6 that under
a specific parameterisation of the protocol, it is possible
to obtain (almost) maximal SLP, i.e., capture ratio = 0.
However, when capture ratio is not 0, then there was a high
number of message collisions due to high message rate or
low network size (thereby causing a high message density,
with a higher likelihood of collisions).
C. Impact of Message Rates on SLP
In this section, we analyse the impact of varying the rates
at which the real source and the fake sources send messages
on SLP. Specifically, we wish to understand how the rates
at which the real and the fake sources send messages affect
SLP. Intuitively, the higher the rate for the fake sources,
the higher the chance of the attacker being “pulled back”,
decreasing the capture ratio. Also, the lower the message
rate for the real source, the lower the capture ratio, as the
real source cannot “attract” the attacker fast enough.
It can be observed from Figures 7 and 8 that increasing the
rate at which fake sources send messages leads to a decrease
in the capture ratio. For example, in Figure 8c, when the fake
sends 8 messages per second (period of 0.125s), the capture
ratio is almost 0, whereas the capture ratio increases when
the message rate is decreased to 0.5. We also observe that
the capture ratio increases whenever the real source sends
messages at a higher rate (as can be observed from Figures 7
and 8), thereby confirming our initial hypothesis. Another
observation in Figures 7 and 8 is that, under a specific
parameterisation of the protocol, it is possible to obtain near-
maximal SLP, i.e., capture ratio = 0.
D. Limitations
The algorithm we have proposed has some limitations. First,
the algorithm works for the network structure we have
defined, i.e., a grid structure with a sink at the centre.
However, we emphasise that the network need not be a
grid, as long as it can be “construed” as a grid. Further, for
the algorithm to work in a different network topology, the
protocol for the fake sources needs to be altered. Second, we
have assumed that the attacker follows messages whenever
he receives one. This precludes an “intelligent” attacker who
can decide to go in one direction only, when he observes that
messages may be coming from various directions. However,
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Figure 5: Duration: Capture ratio for varying duration and fake message rates.
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Figure 6: Duration: Capture ratio for varying duration and fake message rates.
such an assumption provides an upper bound on the level of
privacy that can be obtained.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have explored the fake source technique
for providing SLP in WSNs. We have made several novel
contributions in this paper: (i) we have shown the problem
to be NP-complete, (ii) we have identified two important
parameters, namely message rates and fake message trans-
mission duration, that impact upon the level of privacy an
algorithm can provide, and (iii) we have provided a heuristic
which can provide optimal privacy under specific parameter
settings. In future work, we will address the limitations
we have identified previously. Specifically, we will test our
algorithms on various network topologies to ascertain its
efficiency. We will consider fake sources in the context of a
more perceptive attacker.
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